Towards Successful Realization of the LDACS Cybersecurity Architecture: An Updated Datalink Security Threat- and Risk Analysis by Mäurer, Nils et al.
Towards Successful Realization of the LDACS Cybersecurity Archi-
tecture: An Updated Datalink Security Threat- and Risk Analysis 
 
Nils Mäurer, German Aerospace Center, Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany 
Corinna Schmitt, Research Institute CODE, Bundeswehr University Munich, Germany 
 
Abstract 
Currently Communication Navigation and 
Surveillance (CNS) in civil aviation are undergoing 
huge changes in the framework of the European 
SESAR and the US NextGEN research initiatives. 
One goal is to develop the Future Communication 
Infrastructure (FCI) for civil aviation, consisting of 
AeroMACs for airport communications, SatCOM 
for remote domains, and LDACS for long-range 
wireless digital communications. The trend towards 
digitalization is supposed to solve the problems of 
capacity shortage, frequency saturation and auto-
mated data processing. Due to the digitalization 
process in communication itself and especially in 
critical infrastructure a strong request for cyberse-
curity support was raised. Therefore, a threat-and-
risk analysis for LDACS was performed resulting in 
a first cybersecurity architecture specification draft. 
This paper goes one step further, presenting a suita-
ble set of algorithms and protocols for security sup-
port for LDACS. The set is evaluated performance 
and security wise to match the cybersecurity archi-
tecture specification identified in earlier work. 
1. Introduction 
Worldwide civil air traffic is expected to grow 
by 84% until 2040 compared to 2017 [1]. Thus, 
legacy systems in air traffic management (ATM) 
are likely to reach their capacity limits and the need 
for new aeronautical communication technologies 
becomes apparent [1, 2, 3]. Especially problematic 
is the saturation of VHF band in high density areas 
in Europe, the US, and Asia [4, 5] calling for suita-
ble new digital approaches such as AeroMACS for 
airport communications, SatCOM for remote do-
mains, and LDACS as long-range terrestrial aero-
nautical communications system. 
Making the frequency spectrum’s usage more 
efficient a transition from analogue voice to digital 
data communication [2, 4, 5] is necessary to cope 
with the expected growth of civil aviation and its 
supporting infrastructure. A promising candidate for 
long range terrestrial communications, already in 
the process of being standardized in the Internation-
al Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
1
, is the L-
band Digital Aeronautical Communications System 
(LDACS) [4, 6, 7]. LDACS is a terrestrial digital 
wireless communication system for civil operation-
al aeronautical safety-of-life communication and 
based on 3G and 4G technologies, adapted for safe-
ty critical infrastructure requirements and deployed 
as an inlay system in the L-band next to Distance 
Measuring Equipment (DME) [4, 7, 8]. 
With the augmentation of analogue systems by 
digital substitutes and the related trend towards an 
increased autonomous data processing as justified 
in [1, 3], LDACS requires a thorough cybersecurity 
analysis and cybersecurity architectural design in its 
standards [6], similar to the ones used in 3G, 4G or 
AeroMACS [4, 9, 10, 11] in order to be successful-
ly deployed. In previous work [4, 12, 13] a draft of 
the envisioned cybersecurity architecture for 
LDACS was announced in the community. It spe-
cifically regards special requirements of the 
LDACS environment such as narrow frequency 
ranges, and limited bandwidth. Concerning security 
support, especially for data transfer, it was already 
recommended to investigate for solutions with rea-
sonable low overhead in order to be resource-
efficient and building a key incentive for the envi-
sioned LDACS security specification and standard-
ization.  
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the earlier proposed LDACS 
cybersecurity architecture with a suggestion of dif-
ferent algorithms and protocols for security support. 
The evaluation focuses on performance and robust-
                                                     
1 ICAO – Responsible for establishing international standards 
for civil aviation, ensuring the safe growth and standardization 
of international air transport. 
ness analysis comparing LDACS implementations 
with and without security additions. Thus, Section 2 
presents the envisioned multilink concept by DLR, 
supported within SESAR [2], including background 
information about LDACS leading to LDACS’s 
cybersecurity architecture in Section 3. A threat-
and-risk analysis is presented throughout Section 4 
before concluding the paper in Section 5. 
2. Networking the Sky 
The European initiative Single European Sky 
(SES) started in 2004 with its goal to unify all Eu-
ropean aeronautical sectors founded the accompa-
nying Single European Sky ATM Research 
(SESAR) initiative. Within this large European 
research endeavor and the US pendant Next genera-
tion national Airspace Systems (NextGen), new 
broadband digital data link technologies for air 
traffic management are currently in development 
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. 
 
Figure 1:  DLR’s “Networking the Sky” concept  
 Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between 
the different components building DLR’s “Net-
working the Sky” concept [21, 22] including 
AeroMACS for near airport communications [10, 
23, 24], SatCOM for oceanic, remote and polar 
domains [20, 25], and LDACS A/G for en-route 
terrestrial long-range communications [5, 6, 22, 26]. 
The scope of this paper focuses only on the LDACS 
A/G data link keeping the other communication 
ways and requirements in mind for potential further 
investigations and extensions for cross interactions. 
The development of LDACS started 2007 in 
cooperation between the German Aerospace Center 
(DLR), Frequentis AG, and the University of Salz-
burg in Austria with its origins in merging parts of 
the B-VHF [17], B-AMC [26], TIA-902 (P34), and 
WiMAX IEEE 802.16e technologies [9, 24]. 
Challenging for any kind of specification in 
this application area are the diversity of entities 
involved and their individual requirements and 
specifications, especially on handling a high num-
ber of communication ways. 
An LDACS network consists of three main en-
tities: Aircraft Station (AS), Ground Station (GS) 
and Ground Station Controller (GSC) as illustrated 
in Figure 2. One GS can serve a total of 512 air-
crafts and is in charge of maintaining a continuous 
data stream in the Forward Link (FL) [6]. In com-
parison to FL the involved Reverse Link (RL) is 
structured in individual bursts of data from each 
aircraft and, thus, for each RL communication the 
AS first needs to request the respective resource 
allocation within its cell from the GS, in order to 
send. Several GSs are linked to one GSC, forming 
an LDACS sub-network. The GSC in turn, is the 
link to the Aeronautical Telecommunications Net-
work (ATN), for direct data transfer between air 
traffic control and aircraft. 
 
Figure 2: Entities of LDACS network  
The LDACS protocol stack shown in Figure 3 sup-
ports data and voice communications. Data is split 
into user (e.g., ATM specific service data) and con-
trol data (e.g., link maintenance data) and we dif-
ferentiate between Service Data Unit (SDU) and 
Protocol Data Unit (PDU). A SDU only consists 
of payload, carrying user or control data only. 
A PDU however is formed with a header, the 
actual payload (SDU) and it is possible to at-
tach a trailer, Frame Check Sequence (FCS), 
Message Integrity Code (MIC), Padding etc.. 
LDACS’s physical layer (PHY) transports user data 
in so-called DATA packet data units (PDUs), and 
control data in CC/DC PDUs to the Medium Access 
Control layer (MAC). On the MAC user data is sent 
in the logical Data Channel (DCH) to the Data Link 
Service (DLS) layer, while control data for 
maintaining radio link functions is forwarded to the 
LDACS Management Entity (LME) in the Com-
mon/Dedicated Control Channel (C/DCCH).  How-
ever, MAC also supports two more control chan-
nels: (1) the Random Access Channel (RA), which 
AS can use to request access to the LDACS cell and 
(2), a Broadcast Channel (BC) used by the GS to 
announce their existence to incoming aircraft. An-
other channel used on MAC is the Voice Commu-
nication Channel (VCH) carrying voice messages 
via DLS Class of Service (CoS) 6 to the Aircraft 
Voice Interface (AVI) on the AS and to the Voice 
Unit (VU) on the GS. All logical communication 
channels are shown in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Overview of LDACS logical channels 
for user data (DCH) and control data (BCCH, 
RACH, CCCH, DCCH) [6] 
After passing the MAC and being put into their 
respective logical channel, data is split now on the 
DLS into seven priorities DLS_CoS_0-7, with zero 
being the lowest priority and seven the highest (e.g., 
for safety critical messages). Above the DLS comes 
the Sub-Network Protocol (SNP), which communi-
cates to the LME via control (CTRL) messages 
(e.g., for key handover LME to SNP) in the Sub-
Network of the LDACS cell. AS and GS communi-
cate via the radio link R1. GSC and GS mainly 
communicate via the Stream Control Transmission 
Protocol (SCTP). Hence, several AS are connected 
wirelessly to a GS, which in turn communicates via 
SCTP to the GSC. In figure 3, all LDACS entities 
and protocol stack with their respective communi-
cations channels, black for user data and red/blue 
for radio/sub-net control data, and functionalities as 
described in the previous section. 
3. LDACS’s Cybersecurity Architec-
ture 
An initial draft for LDACS’s cybersecurity ar-
chitecture was presented in [13] providing protec-
tion against previously identified threats (e.g., [12, 
27, 28]). In the following an overview of identified 
asserts, threats, and objectives is presented leading 
to a more detailed cybersecurity architecture for 
LDACS and are kept in mind for the performed 
threat-and-risk analysis. 
3.1. Assets, Threats, and Objectives 
Anything that someone places value upon is 
regarded as asset. for LDACS five assets were 
identified: (1) hardware, (2) software, (3) link, (4) 
data, and (5) services.  
Figure 3: Interaction of all LDACS entities with their respective protocol stacks [6] 
LDACS’s hardware applied in communica-
tion/navigation systems is responsible for the exe-
cution of LDACS relevant software, enabling the 
functionality of LDACS and where LDACS rele-
vant information is stored on. This refers to AS, GS, 
and GSC but also to an Authentication, Authoriza-
tion and Accounting (AAA) server, e.g., integrated 
within the GSC, Access Routers, the links between 
entities and the respective LDACS specific internal 
and shared network and routers. 
LDACS’s software for communication/ navi-
gation capabilities needs to be integrity, authenticity 
and property proven. Thus we need to make sure 
that a software component of the devices or sub 
system is not corrupt, has no errors or other defects. 
Also we have to prevent wrong installation or con-
figuration of the software components.  
All required data links, accurate time syn-
chronization along with LDACS control data and 
radio communications connections enabling 
LDACS to transmit send and receive data via that 
link are assets. Most important here is preventing 
unauthorized access, altered hardware, jamming 
and spoofing. However, we will not introduce 
hardware protection mechanisms such as regular 
quality checks, access limitations to special hard-
ware and control of personal working on that hard-
ware but rather focus on protection of software, the 
radio link and transmitted data due to the early 
specified state of LDACS. 
Data relevant for an error-free execution of the 
LDACS communications system needs to fulfill 
and/or support the following six items: 
1. Identity of communication users and entities or 
participants 
2. The actually transmitted or received communi-
cation data 
3. Confidential data, only accessible for legitimate 
users and entities only 
4. Cryptographic keys used for encryption, de-
cryption, integrity protection and authentication 
5. Configuration data to control, configure or alter 
the functionality and behavior of LDACS 
6. Navigation data including cell location and  
synchronization like the synchronous time in 
the ground stations 
Several services are required for LDACS to 
properly function. The system management, an-
nouncement and routing, mobility and authentica-
tion service are needed for general operability of 
LDACS. As use case, at least 21 high critical user 
data services in Air Traffic Services (ATS) and 14 
high critical Aeronautical Operational Control 
(AOC) data services [5, 12, 27] will run on applica-
tion layer. As new functions in ATS and AOC ser-
vices can be introduced on a frequent basis, this 
work can only contribute to 
highlighting already existing safety relevant ser-
vices in regard to LDACS. Examples of them are 
the ATC Clearance (ACL), Data Link Logon 
(DLL), Flight Plan Consistency (FLIPCY), Flight 
Plan Data (FLTPLAN), Network Connection 
NETCONN or Network KeepAlive NETKEEP 
service. 
Previous analysis identified a series of cyber-
security threats to LDACS [5, 12, 19]. They main-
ly cover the ares of (1) disclosure of information (2) 
denial of service and (3) unauthorized entry to sys-
tem. A selection of example threats is listed in Ta-
ble 1 and used for comparison reason with [10] and 
in section 4.2.  
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(T2) Eavesdropping 







entry to system 
(T7) Altering messages 
(T8) Impersonation of other partici-  
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The LDACS Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARPS) [29] identified among other 
sources [5, 12, 13] the following security objec-
tives for LDACS: 
1. LDACS shall provide a capability to protect the 
availability and continuity of the system. 
2. LDACS shall provide a capability including 
cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integ-
rity of messages in transit. 
3. LDACS shall provide a capability to ensure the 
authenticity of messages in transit. 
4. LDACS should provide a capability for non-
repudiation of origin for messages in transit. 
5. LDACS should provide a capability to protect 
the confidentiality of messages in transit. 
6. LDACS shall provide an authentication capabil-
ity.  
7. LDACS shall provide a capability to authorize 
the permitted actions of users of the system and 
to deny actions that are not explicitly author-
ized.  
8. If LDACS provides interfaces to multiple do-
mains, LDACS shall provide capability to pre-
vent the propagation of intrusions within 
LDACS domains and towards external do-
mains.  
3.2. Architecture Overview  
An initial architecture was already presented in 
[13] and, thus, this section only focuses on the cur-
rent updates of the LDACS cybersecurity architec-
ture regarding security functions and support.  
For secure communication and operation of 
LDACS we need to support and offer the following: 
1. Authentication, Authorization, Accounting 
(AAA) 
2. Availability robustness,  
3. Secure key agreement and negotiations, 
4. Secure key derivation, key and access 
management,  
5. Confidentiality,  
6. Data integrity,  
7. Secure logging, and 
8. System integrity.  
In order to address these eight items a suitable set 
of algorithms, protocols, and LDACS software are 
required.  
As the initial requirement for the envisioned set is 
that everything needs to be resource-efficient that 
is integrated into LDACS. Thus, the essential ques-
tion to be answered is where to locate the intended 
security functions in LDACS. The most memora-
ble finding in the placement of the security func-
tions are ideas to rely mostly on the LDACS Man-
agement Entity (LME) and Sub-Network Protocol 
(SNP) layers of the protocol stack for additional 
cybersecurity in LDACS. 
Previous works [5, 28] suggested putting most 
security functionality in the resource allocation 
level or the Data Link Service (DLS) fragments. 
We think that LME and SNP are more suitable due 
to the following reasons: (1) after being processed 
by lower layers, the first signal to reach an AS from 
a GS, arrives at the LME to enable the access to a 
LDACS cell. (2) Putting additional authentication 
and negotiation functionalities in that layer produc-
es little overhead and enables a secure link. (3) As 
for user data, incoming from the network and appli-
cation layer higher up in the ISO/OSI stack, the first 
step is to put the payload in sub-network LDACS 
specific PDUsin the SNP. (4) Also with the infor-
mation from the network layer, whether encryption 
should be used or not, this task can directly be exe-
cuted without the necessity of lower layers to know 
about it. And (5) finally, it gives our system the 
advantage to support real end-to-end security as the 
data packets are secured between the leaving of the 
ATM system at the inter ace to the GSC and the AS 
SNP and vice-versa, where security checks can be 
performed. Also as the DLS supports a checksum, it 
is guaranteed that packets arriving at the SNP are 
error free and thus if an integrity check or decryp-
tion fails at the SNP, it is highly likely that the data 
has been tampered with.  
LME and SNP communicate via the same 
primitive with lower layers, making it easy to 
put additional security in the data channel using the 
highest fragment/packet priority that is solely re-
served for security data. Before a security clear-
ance, data packets with lower priority cannot be 
transmitted or are dropped.  
The identified arguments answering the loca-
tion question inspired the final implementation in 
LDACS described in the following.   
For AS, GS, and GSC to securely communi-
cate with each other they need to (1) mutually au-
thenticate by using certificates (2) that are linked in 
a LDACS Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), similar 
to AeroMACS [9, 10].  As Bradford et al. men-
tioned in [30], different propositions exist how a 
 
Figure 5: Possibilities on how to establish a 
Chain-of-Trust for all FCI candidates. 
PKI might look like for all Future Communications 
Infrastructure (FCI) candidates (AeroMACS, 
LDACS, SatCOM) as depicted in figure 5. Current-
ly the most viable solution also suitable for LDACS 
is the ICAO Trust Bridge as AeroMACS has al-
ready started with that approach [10]. Other ap-
proaches are to use a regional cross certification 
meaning, that continents, countries or sectors would 
need to cross certify their counterparts in different 
regions of the world, leading to a mesh network of 
trust. Currently the least likely candidate is a trust 
list certification, meaning that Certificate Authori-
ties (CA) from different regions have to put trust in 
each end-entitiy certificate. However the discussion 
which solution will be finally used is still ongoing. 
After authentication of the network partici-
pants AS, GS, and GSC (depicted in figure 6), key 
negotiation starts (3) resulting in a key agreement. 
Next, a key derivation function (KDF) derives suf-
ficiently enough session keys (4) for all sessions 
and maintaining perfect forward secrecy (PFS). 
Now the LME hands over the negotiated and de-
rived keys to the DLS (4) and authorizes the entity 
it has authenticated and negotiated a key with, for 
commencing secure communications (5). The DLS 
hands over the keys to the SNP (6), which in turn 
can start encrypting/decrypting data and apply or 
verify message authentication codes to the SNP (7). 
The SN-PDUs consists of a LDACS specific head-
er, payload from the transport layer above (e.g., 
using the well-known IPv6 and TCP/UDP stack), 
and a trailer with the message authentication codes 
attached.  With the ability of the SNP to perform 
those tasks, the DLS can now start processing the 
SN-PDUs (8). 
The MAC layer secures the logical channels (1-8) 
by allowing signatures to be broadcast from a 
ground station, thus making the validation of the 
authenticity of that ground station possible at the 
first step. Our findings indicate, that while other 
control channels such as the CCCH, DCCH and 
RACH simply lack the space for additional security 
placement, the BCCH offers enough to put a 128 bit 
overhead here for signing that control message [6]. 
However CCH, DCCH and RACH are monitored 
by the MAC for plausibility, such as the avoidance 
of too many reoccurring messages or resource re-
quests. All actions related to LDACS cybersecurity 
are logged in the LME.  Figure 6 illustrates the 
aforementioned eight steps answering the location 
question in the stack of AS/GS. 
 
Figure 6: Steps realizing secure communication  
When not having the focus for secure commu-
nication establishment on the placement of the 
functionalities in the stack, the complete process 
can be broken down into three phases depicted in 
Figure 7:   
 Phase 1: GSC and GS establish a secure 
connection using e.g., the Station-to-
Station protocol, as suggested below. This 
allows for mutual authentication and key 
negotiations. After mutual authentication, 
a key confirmation message concludes this 
phase. 
 Phase 2: Now GSC and GS have estab-
lished a trusted connection and the GS can 
start broadcasting beacons in the BCCH 
with parameters provided by the most 
trusted entity, the GSC. This allows for in-
coming AS to identify and authenticate the 
GS on first contact. If the AS has verified 
the identity of the GS, a cell entry request 
can be sent from the AS, as it is now as-
sured to be talking to a legitimate GS. 
 Phase 3: The AS can send its credentials to 
the GS as it has established an untrusted 
connection with the GS after cell entry. 
Now GS and GSC can verify the claimed 
identity of the AS and after authentication 
of the AS, mutual key negotiations can 
start, resulting in derived session keys and 
a key confirmation message between GSC 
and AS. Thus we have established a secure 
connection between AS and GSC. 
 
Figure 7: Phase concept to establish secure 
communication [13] 
As soon as a secure communication possibility 
is in place the data exchange can happen.  
3.3 Protocol Selection for strengthening 
LDACS Cybersecurity Architecture 
Here we point out which algorithms and proto-
cols should be used, fulfilling the request of re-
source-efficiency and the eight security require-
ments mentioned in the beginning of Section 3.2. 
After several months of investigation and analysis 
of different approaches we received the following 
recommendation list:  
1. Trust comes via distributing trust from offline-
ICAO CA, Sub-Ca, until end-entity certificate 
in the end device. We suggest X.509 certificates 
and distribution of them in a chain of trust. 
However as quantum computers with sufficient 
Q-Bits do not seem far off, RSA asymmetrical 
procedures can only be used in the short term 
due to Shor’s algorithm [31]. To replace that we 
would recommend a key-size optimized 
McEliece post-quantum robust procedure [32]. 
2. Entities must be mutually authenticated, where 
we recommend the Station-to-Station protocol 
due to low overhead and key agreeing possibili-
ties [33]. 
3. To negotiate key material between entities we 
also recommend the Station-To-Station proto-
col with the same reasons as before. 
4. To derive arbitrary number of keys we recom-
mend using a HMAC-Key Derivation Function 
(HKDF) such as defined in RFC 5869 [34]. 
5. As entities need to be loosely time synchro-
nized, we can use the Timed Efficient Stream 
Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) broad-
cast authentication protocol [35] for securing 
our broadcast beacons rom the GS. 
6. For encryption we recommend AES-256-GCM 
with Galois Counter Mode (GCM) being a 
mode of operation on symmetric key block. It 
provides authenticated encryption/decryption 
and can also be used for integrity protection 
[36]. 
7. In terms of integrity and authenticity of mes-
sages in transit, we recommend HMAC with 
trapdoor functions from the SHA-3 family [37, 
38] or as mentioned above, AES-GCM.  
4. Threat-and-Risk Analysis 
Already in [12] LDACS was rated. The main 
outcome here was that no cybersecurity was im-
plemented then and thus all threats were dangerous 
for LDACS. With the updates and the security im-
provements introduced throughout the earlier sec-
tions of this paper we can state that the cybersecuri-
ty support is now strengthened in LDACS. In order 
to prove this, a threat-and-risk analysis is performed 
here. But keep the following in mind: By identify-
ing threats impacting confidentiality, integrity or 
availability we set out a collection of threats to test 
LDACS robustness, with and without our proposed 
security architecture. This threat catalogue is not 
complete but spans a rather broad scope of possible 
attacks. We chose a limited threat catalogue, al-
ready shown in Table 1, with exactly the chosen 
threats to be able to measure LDACS robustness 
against various attacks, but also to not overcompli-
cated threat identification as there are an unlimited 
numbers of possible threats to LDACS.  
4.1. Methodology 
The rating methodology applied here is similar 
to the one already performed in [12], however now 
on the LDACS system with security additions. We 
chose the Common Criteria (CC) process also for 
the rating procedure, with averaged likelihood and 
maximum severity, as the CC methodology is also a 
guide for the evaluation IT products with security 
functionality [36].We adapted previous quantitative 
threat rating scales to give a quantitative measure-
ment of the risk a certain threat poses. A severity-
likelihood matrix is commonly used to rate a certain 
threat [36] but the method on how to weight severi-
ty and likelihood can differ 
We decided to take the severity rating as 
done in the Communications Operating Concepts 
and Requirements (COCR) analysis [19] but for 
likelihood, we defined our own solution introducing 
the following factors [12]:  
 Elapsed Time 
Time required identifying a vulnerability, 
to develop an attack and to mount and sus-
tain it. 
 Expertise 
We set the scale from no technical 
knowledge required to several experts 
from different fields required to success-
fully launch an attack. 
 Knowledge of System 
Here we rate from “public knowledge” to 
“highly confidential”. 
 Window of Opportunity 
We describe this as the time we need for 
the system to be accessible for successfully 
attack it. 
 Equipment 
This measures the quality of equipment 
needed for an attack, from highly available 
to multiple bespoke specialized hard- and 
software. 
 Distributed Attack  
In order to launch a successful attack, how 
many targets needs to be compromised, is 
measured here from one to more than 100 
different targets. 
 Location dependent 
Accessibility of an online or offline only 
target defines part of the difficulty for at-
tacking it. 
Each factor was rated from 0 to 5 based on a 
defined premise with 0 being the most likely event 
and 5 the least likely. The average value of these 
factors was finally set as the likelihood of a threat to 
occur with a value of 0 - 1 being “very likely" and 4 
- 5 being “extremely improbable".  
Introducing a quantitative threat rating system 
for a non-operational system is challenging, as we 
need quantifiable values for that like amounts of 
vulnerabilities, severity of vulnerability, etc.. And 
as we do not have that, the values used for the se-
verity-likelihood matrix emerge entirely from rea-
soned evaluation of the threats danger by a Cyber-
security expert. Also, our threat-and-risk analysis 
revealed, that prior to [4, 12, 28] and this work, 
basically no cybersecurity measures were imple-
mented in LDACS, making it very vulnerable in its 
state, prior to our architecture proposal. 
4.2. Comparing LDACS Security Level with 
and without the Security Additions 
In our rating system, there are three levels: 
”Negligible” (Green) meaning the threat is 
known and accepted, but deemed harmless. 
“Medium” (Yellow) meaning that no immedi-
ate actions, e.g., additional encryption, software 
patches, must be done to hinder the occurrence of 
the threat, but the threat itself and its development 
will be looked at closely. 
“Dangerous” (Red) indicates that the impact 
of a successful attack is not acceptable and direct 
counter measures (e.g., changing cipher suite, up-
dating system) must be introduced. 
Before the deployment of the LDACS’s cyber-
security architecture three of the eight threats were 
rated as medium and five as dangerous (cf. Table 
2).  Now we do the same evaluation with the securi-
ty measures included in the LDACS protocol stack 
specified in Section 3.2 and illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Threat #1 - Scanning the Network:  
This threat was previously rated as medium 
because gaining access to the LDACS network and 
sending probes is easier when no encryption, entity 
authentication or integrity checks for messages 
is deployed. Now with added access protection 
mechanisms, we have hardened LDACS against 
this threat. We now rate it as negligible. 
Threat #2 – Eavesdropping: 
Without encryption, listening on the same frequen-
cy enabled capturing the ATN data stream from 
aircraft to ground station, which is why we rated it 
as dangerous. With the added encryption of Aero-
nautical Operational Control (AOC) traffic, captur-
ing data became harder. However to entirely protect 
all ATM traffic, the relevant flight surveillance 
companies, such as EUROCONTROL, must have 
access to the decryption keys of all Air Traffic Ser-
vices (ATS) streams from all flight surveillance 
authorities. ATS is regulating and assisting aircraft 
in real-time for ensuring their safe operations, thus 
higher latency, introduced by the key-sharing and 
decryption process, introduces an additional safety 
risk. With these results we prevent eavesdropping 
on just a part of the data exchange, with the need of 
organizational changes in the field to enable the 
entire encryption of ATM traffic. Thus, the threat 
still remains dangerous and countermeasures must 
be investigated and integrated as soon as possible.  
Threat #3 - Man in the Middle Attack:  
With no entity authentication, just inserting another 
party into the communication and reading the traffic 
is possible. However if the intercepted packets were 
to be altered and reinserted to the system, the at-
tacker had to make sure that the original packets 
would not reach the recipient, which is a very hard 
task in wireless communications.  As a successful 
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack has a very high 
impact on the system in total and as there were no 
counter measures against this attack, we gave this 
attack the rating dangerous. Now as every partici-
pating entity has to authenticate to each other and 
integrity checks are applied to the messages, be-
coming a man in the middle proves a harder task 
than before. Thus, we rate it now as medium. 
Threat #4 - Flooding the network:  
Unfortunately our cybersecurity architecture update 
did not include any direct flooding prevention 
mechanisms except for rate limiting from certain 
entities. But as rate limiting, load mitigation and 
rerouting can be enough against flooding attacks, 
we reduce the threat level from dangerous to medi-
um. 
Threat #5 - Injecting messages:  
Injecting messages to a system is easier when the 
participants do not need to authenticate to each 
other. With the introduction of entity authentication 
and integrity checks, we hardened LDACS against 
this threat. Now an entity can still send in the 
LDACS cell because of its wireless nature, but 
packets from unauthenticated source will be 
dropped. The rating itself still remains medium, but 
loses one point in likelihood as performing such an 
attack is now more difficult. 
Threat #6 - Interfering with the data link: 
Jammers, physical violence against LDACS hard-
ware or power outages are not regarded in the archi-
tecture thus the threat rating remains medium. 
Threat #7 - Altering messages: 
Previously rated as dangerous, the risk of this threat 
has been reduced by several means. Entity authenti-
cation prevents easy access to the system, encryp-
tion prevents reading of actual messages but ulti-
mately integrity checks in the form of message au-
thentication codes attached to messages can harden 
against this threat. Thus we rate it as medium now. 
Threat #8 - Impersonating other participants of 
communication: 
Before additional measures, this threat was rated 
dangerous. Now the impersonation is much harder, 
as access to private keys of legitimate communica-
tion participants would be required due to the entity 
authentication mechanism. Or the cryptography 
behind our concept would have to be broken. 
4.2.1 LDACS without Security Additions 
For comparability reasons with the new rating of 
LDACS’ cybersecurity, we provide the old rating 
from [12] in table 2, where we see that the majority 
of threats #2, 3, 4, 7, 8 were rated dangerous. 
Table 2: Threat criticality rating on LDACS 
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4.2.2 LDACS with Security Additions 
As we have described the changes in cybersecurity 
due to the introduction of our cybersecurity solution 
for LDACS in chapter 4.2, we sum up the rating of 
severity in table 3. Values in bold are the final rat-
ing, derived from taking the maximum value from 
all rows in a column. 
Table 3: Threat severity rating 
Properties Threats 




1 1 1 3 2 2 2 3 
Air Traffic 
Control 
2 1 2 3 2 4 3 3 
Cost 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 
Fatalities 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 
“Flying 
Public” 





2 4 4 1 3 1 2 4 
Maximum 2 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 




⌋, thus we take the average value of all 
rating factors and use the floor function. The result 
is depicted in table 4: 
Table 4: Threat likelihood rating 
Factor Threats 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
Elapsed 
Time 
3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 
Expertise 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 
Knowledge 
of System 
3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 
Window of 
Opportunity 
1 3 3 1 3 2 3 4 
Equipment 1 2 2 1 3 4 3 2 
Distributed 
Attack 
3 4 3 2 3 3 3 2 
Location 
dependent 
3 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 
Average 2.4 2.9 3.3 2.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 
Rating 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 
 
Finally we use our values from severity and 
likelihood and put it into our severity, likelihood 
matrix from the common criteria process [12, 36]. 
As we can see in table 5, the impact of threats 
was reduced significantly, when comparing to 
LDACS previous state. Only one threat remained as  
Table 5: Applying the rating system onto select-
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dangerous, simply because there will be unencrypt-
ed traffic in the system, easy to eavesdrop upon. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper an updated LDACS architecture 
was introduced with focus on cyber security sup-
port. It was clearly justified where which security 
function should be placed in the stack to be re-
source-efficient and allowing simple interaction 
with the components of DLR’s “Networking the 
Sky” concept. Especially, the direct comparison 
concerning threat rating showed that with the inte-
gration of security functionality in LDACS threats’ 
impact could be reduced. Only the risk of jamming 
the wireless communication could not be dimin-
ished which is challenging in general and is still 
under investigation in many disciplines.   
Based on the received results security func-
tionalities need to be included in the standardization 
process of LDACS in order to face crime activities. 
We are convinced that with our contributions, 
LDACS will have a better chance at being deployed 
worldwide as the standard for civil aeronautical 
communications in the continental areas for the 
next thirty years to come. 
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